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Major General Kees Homan (ret) RNLMC,
Institute "Clingendael", The Hague, The Netherlands
The European Union is actively engaged in meeting the institutional and military conditions for pursuing a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). For all the problems, the EU has made much progress over the past time. Both the capabilities conference and the Nice summit in December 2000 made great progress towards the implementation of the CESDP. Three important new institutions, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee (EMC) and the Military Staff (EMS) have been established by a decision of the Council in January 2001. The PSC has quickly become the 'linchpin' of CFSP and CESDP and has a 'central role' in the definition and follow-up of EU response to a crisis. It supervises the implementation of EU decisions in response to crisis conditions and is charged in the Treaty of Nice with responsibility for crisis management under the direction of the Council. At the European Council in Nice it was decided that the PSC would restrict itself to keep track of the international situation and contribute to the formulation of the "opinions for the Council". Nevertheless the PSC is clearly subordinate of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). But the PSC is, de facto, the single most important group in the management of CFSP and CESDP after the General Affairs Council itself.
The EUMC was established as a Council group to give military advice as required to the PSC and to direct the work of the EUMS. The EUMC meets at the level of Chiefs of Defence when circumstances warrant. The Chairman of the EUMC attends Council meetings when decisions with defence implications are taken. The Council decision setting up the EUMC noted that military advice from it to the PSC would be based on 'consensus'.
The EUMS is designed to assist the Council structures exercise political control and strategic direction for Petersberg-type operations. This military staff will not do the planning for a specific deployment or operation, but rather draw up strategic military options for the Council, which will be evaluated by the EUMC.
The office of High Representative (HR) for CFSP - to be held simultaneously with the office of Secretary General of the Council of Ministers - was already established by the Amsterdam Treaty. The HR is responsible to the European Council for the management of the CFSP and so can be regarded as virtually the EU's minister for foreign affairs and defence. In the event of an EU military response to a crisis the role of the HR remains unclear. According to the Council Decision establishing the PSC, the exact role of the HR relative to the PSC will be determined by specific reference in the Joint Action to be approved by the Council at the time.
However, in establishing those new institutions, the governments have missed an opportunity to revamp the entire organisation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The vast array of crisis management tools of the EU is an extensive combination of military and non-military instruments. There is evident need to bridge the gap between the CFSP and the external policies of the first pillar, so that EU can co-ordinate the use of its various foreign policy tools. As a result, the EU is pursuing a bifurcated foreign policy: politics is dealt with in the inter-governmental second pillar as a declaratory and penniless exercise; substantive and funded external policies belong to the first pillar and are implemented by the Commission. Even before September 11, this ambiguous approach was hard to follow, since also a clear distinction in any crisis between the use of military and of civil measures can not be made. The campaign against terrorism, started after the attacks on New York and Washington, illustrates quite rightly the broad diplomatic, military and humanitarian approach needed for developing an effective overall policy to combat this kind of threats.
An important challenge for the CESDP is how to involve in a proper and satisfactory manner other nations in the decision-making process of the EU. Until now the arrangements are not very satisfactory. There is now a jigsaw puzzle of arrangements and proposals for consultations with and involvement by other nations in those crisis-situations where the EU takes the lead. "Consultations with Canada will be stepped up in times of crisis" and "specific consultation and participation mechanisms" for Russia and other nations are envisaged. With the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation "at all levels" are foreseen. One issue on which member-states do not agree is whether an EU military mission would require a UN mandate. Of course, this is only relevant for a mission to a country where the local government has not issued an invitation. But also processes for establishing in-theatre relationships with Non Governmental Organizations and Private Voluntary Organization have to be established. In this complicated web of patterns of co-ordination, consultation and co-operation room has to be made for a close relationship with two specific countries.
First, a harmonisation with the United States at all stages of European decision-making is extremely important. The EU's transition to full operating capability to undertake Petersberg missions will require the development of the EU's relationship with NATO and the relevant national and multinational headquarters of EU Member States. The Bush administration has taken a much more encouraging approach toward CESDP than its predecessor. Secretary of State Powell, widely considered the architect of the more EU-friendly posture in the Administration, believes he has assurances from his EU counterparts that ESDP will develop "in a way that will be fully integrated within the planning activities of NATO". In December 2000 NATO agreed that six annual meetings between the North Atlantic Council and the EU's PSC at ambassadorial level, and two more at ministerial level will take place. The respective Military Committees and their various substructures will also come together in a similar manner.
However, Turkey has still not accepted the accord on EU-NATO relations that every other member of NATO - including the US - approved last December. Turkey has demanded the right to be included in the ESDP's decision-making. The EU's response is that Turkey should be involved in the shaping of decisions and the management of operations, when Turkish forces participate; but that because Turkey is not a member of the EU, it cannot claim the right to veto autonomous EU actions that do not involve Turkey.
Because of this blockage, the EU does not have guaranteed access to NATO planning facilities at SHAPE. Furthermore, NATO has to approve any formal contact between EU and NATO officials on a case-by-case basis. This is starting to hamper EU's efforts to build up its military organisation.
The EU has progress to make on building up its military capabilities. In December 1999 the heads of state and government of all 15 EU member states agreed upon the so-called Headline and other capability targets for military crisis management, resulting in the Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration of November 20, 2000. The headline goal is quite ambitious: sustaining 50-60,000 troops in the field for a year implies a total pool of at least 200,000 available troops, plus three mobile corps headquarters that can rotate in and out of the area concerned. At the European Council in Feira in June 2000, it was decided to strengthen EU's civil crisis management capabilities. The biggest shortages are on the logistical side. EU members lack sufficient air-lift and sea-lift; transportable docks, communications equipment and headquarters; and intelligence-gathering satellites, aircraft and UAVs. But there are also some serious gaps at the sharper end of military operations, such as the suppression of enemy air defences, combat search and rescue and precision-guided weapons. These gaps are a problem because they limit the scope of any autonomous mission the EU may wish to undertake.
One criteria for measuring the EU's boosting of capabilities is budgets. In constant 1999 dollars, defence-spending by the 15 EU-member states declined from 178 billion dollar in 1997 to an estimated 147 billion dollar in 2001. But this year eight out of the 11 EU members of NATO, including Britain, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, have increased their defence budgets in real terms.
In the field of transforming to professional armed forces, Europe is making progress. As of next year, France will have an all-professional army. Spain and Italy have begun to abolish conscription. Germany's recent emphasis on building up crisis reaction forces is having some effect. Sweden has restructured its armed forces, reducing from 29 to 8 the number of brigades focused on territorial defence, while increasing the forces available for peacekeeping.
For many years, the Petersberg tasks were a synonym for low-risk, small-scale operations, tailored for the now superseded Western European Union. A new, broad interpretation was sought in accordance with the ambitions of the EU in the framework of a CESDP. All sorts of operations, "including the most demanding ones", with the clear exception of collective defence, are covered by this interpretation. In order to specify the necessary capabilities for the Helsinki Headline Goal, decisions have to be taken on the kinds of operations to be carried out. True, a number of so-called 'Illustrative Mission Profiles', ranging from separation by force to humanitarian aid and evacuation have been formulated. But these profiles will guide policy makers and military planners only to a certain extent, because they are not intended to furnish criteria enabling European leaders to decide on what particular situation may require what sort of operation, nor are they meant to define the operational range for EU-led missions. The lack of strategic guidance also creates uncertainty about both the numbers and nature of the required military means and support systems. The same goes for the prospects of a division of labour between the EU and NATO, as long as it is unclear whether, where and when the EU is able and willing to carry out operations. Recent experience suggests that the political support for any military operation rests for a large part on a clear understanding of the type of mission which is under consideration. Vagueness in this respect could be very harmful at the very moment a political justification has to be given for the use of military force by the EU.
What is lacking, is a EU Strategic Concept that facilitates the development towards a common orientation of the defence plans of all EU member states. It would also be helpful in determining which contingencies and crisis situations might be suited for an European involvement. A common approach, laid down in a strategic concept, might help to avoid an endless debate between 15 countries looking for consensus.
In addition to these rather general, political considerations that underline the necessity or a least the desirability for strategic guidance in the CESDP, the availability of a Strategic Concept may facilitate the solution of many delicate problems. At present, no European country is able to conduct very demanding, high risk operations on its own. A Strategic Concept may stimulate military problems at the European level, and may also be conducive to role specialization between the EU member states. This may, in turn, lead to the elimination or at least the significant reduction of national overlaps and redundancies. In the best of all worlds, the net financial gains to be derived from increased efficiency and effectiveness in military spending through the creation of European pools of military resources as well as by role differentiation among countries would compensate to a large extent the funds need to fill up the deficiencies and shortcomings, as exposed in the (W)EU-Audit and NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative.
For any substantial military operation to be successful, unity of command seems to be essential. To conduct an operation involving fifteen or more democratic countries on an equal footing comes, there fore, close to a 'contradictio in terminis'. Conventional wisdom has it that one can not wage war by large, representative committees. A lead nation or a directorate of countries with considerable military contributions in any mission would provide for a stable leadership in highly sensitive crisis situations in which the European Union as a whole would like to the lead. This, however, is not the case in the EU, where member states have equal rights regardless of their willingness to share risks in any mission. To tackle this problem the countries of the EU should ensure the decisiveness in crisis situations by delegating authority into the hands of a Eurogroup of a small number of countries with the largest numbers of units, especially combat units, in the mission at stake.
The Contact Group model that has been used in relation to the former Yugoslavia is likely to be more effective in the short term than an EU wide intergovernmental approach. The practice of constructive abstention in the EU Council by member government who do not perceive a national interest or who can not command a national consensus will need to be refined as an example.
Spending more on defence and increasing the defence budget under economically uncertain circumstances seems not to be the most viable option. Most European countries will over a number of years only be able to maintain the present level of defence expenditures. Other ways to get more bang for a Euro have to be explored. This leads to a number of questions about the need and possibilities for closer co-operation between the armed forces in the EU and the prospects of convergence. Will it be possible to train, equip and deploy the armed forces of the EU on the basis of a set of common criteria and qualifications?
Without such a set of common standards the fifteen armies, navies and air forces of the EU member states will continue to operate as separate national contributions in missions, which more than ever demand a high degree of division of labour and role specialisation. Despite fifty years of defence planning in the integrated military structure of NATO, the armed forces of those EU member states belonging to NATO do not share so many common features that units of one country can be rotated with units from another country. In NATO-led operations this problem does not cause insurmountable obstacles. Thanks to the leading role of the United States and its armed forces, the contributions of the other NATO-countries to this kind of missions usually do not constitute a key role in the process of composing an appropriate force structure. But for EU-led operations, without the availability of a vast reservoir of US military capabilities, the lack of interoperability and sustainability is one of the main obstacles for further integration. The armed forces of many EU member states still focus predominantly on national defence concerns. The EU member states can make available an impressive number of units, key weapon systems and capabilities. But taken together, they lack the quality, interoperability and sustainability of the American armed forces. For those championing the CESDP as a means of improving European defence capabilities and therefore strengthening NATO this creates a wide range of challenges for cooperation and integration in the defence field. The present review mechanism is focussed exclusively on the efforts to be made to achieve the Helsinki Headline Goal. Such a mechanism should be expanded and simultaneously be used to improve the national defence efforts as well.
While CESDP has become a matter of high priority in Western Europe, in Russia this issue remains a subject of interest to just a few academics. The general public in Russia has practically no knowledge of the EU. Unlike NATO, the EU is not perceived as an antagonistic military bloc. The EU and Russia signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in June 1994 which apart from dealing with trade, institutionalises a broad political dialogue between two 'partners'. The EU has placed Russia in a pivotal position in the debate on European security and has emphasized the fact that the EU is interested in the "full involvement of Russia in the development of a comprehensive European security architecture in which Russia has its due place". The new Russian leadership itself has expressed the intention to enhance the EU-Russian security partnership, including its military, political and technical aspects. In the Joint Statement of the Russia-EU Summit in May 2000: "President Putin expressed the positive interest towards forming EU security and defence policy" and noted in this respect the existing possibilities for cooperation. A more important result of the next Summit, in October 2000 in Paris, was Russia's step beyond its rather vague policy of simply declaring its interest and 'special attention' in CESDP towards lending constructive support aimed at development of a practical partnership.
The tragic events on September 11 will without doubt lead to a fundamental review of the security policies of the United States and the (countries of the) European Union. Internal and external security policies can no longer be separated. Nevertheless the upcoming European Council in Laeken will take the decision to make the EU operational in the field of defence. It has to be kept in mind that with at present some 47,000 military participating in peace-keeping and peace-enforcing operations, ranging from SFOR and KFOR to Southern Watch, the countries of the EU are at this moment already able to field a crisis-management force of the size envisaged in the present Helsinki Headline Goal. Later on, the incoming Spanish EU-Presidency could help the European Security and Defence Policy quite substantially. First, Spain could develop an agenda for the further elaboration of the Helsinki Headline Goal. Second, Spain could start a process among the EU member states to encourage convergence of their defence policies and thus create a wide range of fields for cooperation and role sharing.
While there there is no blueprint to achieve these quite ambitious tasks the Spanish Presidency will find itself in a unique position to lay down a time schedule which might set clear milestones on the way to a genuine European Security and Defence Policy. These next steps to a common defence policy are to be set in a period for almost fifteen years and they take account of many of the above mentioned recommendations.