Geoffrey D. Gooch
Jean Monnet Professor
University of Linköping

Post-Decisional Politics on the European Union–Russian Border

The probable accession of the three Baltic States and Poland to the EU within the next few years will move the Union’s external borders eastwards, past and over what was once a buffer zone of protection for Russia’s northwest flank. All of the four EU applicant states are, even after over a decade of independence, still attempting to come to terms with the major changes in international relations that have occurred, and they will be faced by more problems in the future, as the formation of this new border will place specific demands both on the member states of the enlarged EU and on Russia. It will create difficulties arising from conflicting national aims and ambitions, from questions of national security, and also problems resulting from institutional interaction at regional and local levels, as well as problems associated with the implementation of national, regional, and local policies.

Let us first distinguish between international relations occurring at the state level, and trans-boundary relations that take place at the regional and local levels. Looking at the two sides of this future EU border, we can see that in Western Europe a contemporary trend involves a shift of political power in what at first sight seems to be two opposite directions; from the national state to the European Union and from the national central state level to the regions. On closer examination, however, it can be seen that these two developments are often interconnected. They can be seen as forming different parts of a circle of redistribution of political power in the EU. It is now common to describe this system as one of multi-level governance, a structure in which varying levels of decision-making and implementation are intertwined together with the business sector and civil society. Within the Russian Federation, however, a process of re-centralisation of political power has taken place after 2000. This provides a radically different framework for political decision-making and implementation than the multi-level system of the EU. It also differs from the systems of the Baltic States and Poland, which are at present occupied with a course of adaptation to EU norms and standards.

I will therefore claim that it is necessary to study not only national decision-making but also the processes through which national policies are managed at regional and local levels. These processes play a vital role, as implementation is not a smooth, linear process, however much we might wish that it were. As the execution of national policies takes place predominantly within state institutions, it is within these institutions, often at the regional and local levels, that we should look for the ways that policy is locally formed. The range of factors that influence implementation will be termed here post-decisional politics (Jordan 1997) in order to distinguish them from pre-decisional politics, and to stress that implementation is not value-free. Problems related to executing policies are of course well known for both academics and practitioners. Problems may arise when, for example, implementation at regional and local levels is prejudiced by political ambitions different from and competing with those affecting national decision-making. Relations between the EU applicant states and the Russian Federation are therefore determined not only by the realities of the new international order, but also by the institutionalisation of residual beliefs, attitudes, and persisting perceptions of each other and of history, perceptions grounded in a common, but differently understood, past. Within institutions we can often see that these perceptions are internalised as institutional norms, values and beliefs. Jordan, for example, states that “…institutional procedures are not neutral but embody beliefs and ideas that provide an advantage to some actors over others…” (Jordan 2000). Unfortunately, while these institutional procedures, beliefs and ideas are pivotal, it is exactly within this area of the policy process that our knowledge is particularly insufficient. The role of post-decisional politics has not yet been sufficiently examined (Jordan 1997), and the study of the implementation of transboundary relations suffers from the lack of systematic, cross-national research. In this respect it shares the problem with other forms of comparative studies of public administration, such as studies of administrative change (Knill 2001). According to Peters (Peters 1988) this is partly a result of an earlier lack of systematic theoretical development in public administration research, where descriptive and normative studies have dominated. Lack of comparative studies may also have led to an erroneous belief that little variation occurred between countries. How then can we develop our knowledge of this vital stage of the policy process?

As an alternative to traditional realist theory, a cognitive approach can be utilised. I will not go into details of these theories here, but simply note that cognitive approaches take into consideration the perceptions and belief systems of the decision-makers, while also attempting to identify casual connections between ideas and policy outcomes (Bieler 2001). The decision-makers’ perceptions of the situation at hand are central for the approach. According to Jervis, “Our understanding of the actor’s images and beliefs affects the further questions that we ask about that event and the behaviour that we expect of the actor in other cases” (Jervis 1976: 30). There are of course many other factors that affect the policy process, and Jervis notes four levels of possible analysis: the decision-making process; the bureaucracy; the nature of the state and the workings of domestic politics; and the international environment. When studying post-decisional politics in trans-boundary contexts the bureaucracy is a natural focus of attention, and here it is necessary to analyse both institutional and individual perceptions, as well as the ways that information is made available and understood. Ideas can become legitimised as organisational rules and procedures in institutions (Yee 1996), and they are seen as important as they are believed to directly influence policy in ways that do not always coincide with the rational self-interest of individuals or institutions (Goldstein and Keohane 1973). The cognitive approach claims instead that “Research on cognition and decision-making demonstrates that individual choices are as much a function of consistent heuristics and biases as they are the result of calculated costs and benefits’ (Berejikian 2002: 166). A similar point was made by Festinger in 1957 (Festinger 1957) who claimed that individuals will reject ideas and information that do not fit into their accepted mind-frame, as these would otherwise lead to cognitive dissonance, an unpleasant state of mind that demands either rejection of the new information or changes to existing ideas.

In the case of transboundary post-decisional politics on the EU-Russian border, existing images and beliefs are likely to be based on different understandings of previous and present conditions and events. When, for example, the Estonian-Russian border is disputed, or when the border agreement fails to be ratified, this can be seen not simply as a result of rational territorial demands on land, lake and river, but also as the result of differing perceptions concerning the motives and ambitions of the other side. For Russia this can involve doubts about the treatment of ethnic Russian minorities in Estonia, and for Estonia it can involve suspicion of Russian ambitions and national pride. Following the break-up of the Soviet Empire at the end of the 1980s about 60 million former Soviet citizens suddenly found themselves “abroad”. Of these, almost 500,000 were then in Estonia and 800,000 in Latvia. The ethnic conflicts of the early 1990s were aggravated by the disputes over citizenship rights in the two countries, in which ethnic Russians were seen by themselves and by Russia, as discriminated. The situation in Estonia and Latvia is now complicated by the fact that while Estonian and Latvian are the official languages of the countries, there are at the same time parts of the countries, and many areas in the main cities, where Estonian and Latvian is hardly heard at all (Dawisha and Parrott 1997)

An example of how cognitive aspects of this problem can practically influence policy can be seen in the way in which the governor of Pskov region (Evgeniy Mikhailov), noted that Russia and Estonia have deep disagreements on the situation of Russians in Estonia. He stated that improvements for the Russian minority in Estonia could only be achieved when “Russia and the West together will be able to make Estonia respect the rights of Russians” (www.rosbalt.ru 2002). The perception here is that Estonia is NOT respecting Russian rights and will not do so without being forced by both Russia and the West. This is of course a view seldom shared by the Estonians themselves. On the other hand, the Pskov region and its governor may also be perceived in ways that they may not themselves agree with. The region has, for example, been presented by the media as being ‘spoilt with money from the federal centre or as a personal fiefdom of the governor” (Riskin 2002).

Preconceived perceptions of animosity might therefore lead individuals and institutions to “think that countries that are our enemies make proposals that would harm us, work against the interest of our friends, and aid our opponents” (Jervis 1976:117-118). In the formation of perceptions the mass media plays a major role, as it is through the mass media that we mostly gain information on places and events of which we have no first-hand knowledge. A report about a visit by a group from the Kaliningrad regional Duma to Vilnius (www.kaskad-info.ru 2002), for example, complained that “What is interesting is that the Russian mass media for unknown reasons covered only the most radical viewpoints… Such viewpoints can be roughly summarised in this way. If the border remains transparent, hundreds of Russian Mafiosi, drug-addicts and prostitutes will pour into”. In this case it would seem that the Russian mass media attempted to construct an image of the Lithuanians as intolerant and uninformed, and image which, if accepted by the Russian public and policy makers, will undoubtedly influence border negotiations.

Let me take a last example of how perceptions can influence politics. The problems of waste treatment here in St.Petersburg are well known, if not notorious. Existing landfill sites create a number of major problems and are dependent on a ready supply of new land as a repository of waste. A waste incineration plant has been proposed as a solution, but the views held by the authorities and environmental groups do not coincide. This is of course not unusual, nor is the fact that the two sides hold diametrically different views of their own and their opponent’s motives. In The St.Petersburg Times on Friday June 21 this year (Bigg 2002), the Greenpeace project coordinator for St.Petersburg (Igor Babanin), saw the city’s motivation for acquiring an incinerator as a result of “some personal preference within the administration, or maybe the city has been made a tempting offer by a foreign firm”. He also believed that the authorities were capable of planning illegal acts, and of preparing to change the laws if necessary. The head of project development at the Committee for Power Supply and Engineering (Andrei Vassiliev), on the other hand, stated that “Greenpeace officials are far too emotional in their approach to the problem of waste. They would like us to go back to the Stone Age in order to preserve the environment”. These categorical and antagonistic perceptions of each other’s motives are bound to influence any cooperation negatively, and make optimal solutions harder to achieve. In this kind of context rationality may have a hard time.

Finally, I would like to point out that the cognitive approach that I have sketched out here does not necessarily lead to a view of the future as a negative, pessimistic, loose-loose situation. While preconceived mind-frames do strongly influence individuals and institutions, these individuals and institutions can also learn, through trust building and through experience, to see beyond their preconceptions. A major problem in the present situation is however that in many of the border regions the turnover of officials is very high. New individuals are posted to important positions, only to be replaced before they have had time to begin a learning process that might lead to readjustment or replacement of the perceptions that they bring with them. More stabile institutional structures could therefore perhaps help to alleviate some of the problems being experienced in post-decisional politics on Russia’s northwest borders, and a cognitive approach might well be able to complement and improve more traditional ways of attempting to manage the major problems that we are, and will be, faced with.

References

Berejikian, J. D. (2002) “A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence”, Journal of Peace Research, 39(2).

Bieler, A. (2001) “Questioning Cognitivism and Constructivism in IR Theory: Reflection on the material structure of ideas”, Politics: Surveys, Debates and Controversies in Politics, 21(2).

Bigg, C. (2002) “Activists Propose Waste Solution”, The St. Petersburg Times, 21 June.

Dawisha, K. and B. Parrott (eds) (1997) The consolidation of democracy in East-Central Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Festinger, L. (1957) A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Goldstein,J. and R. O. Keohane (eds) (1973) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Jervis, R. (1976) Perception and Misperception in International Politics Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Jordan, A. (2000) “The politics of multilevel environmental governance: subsidiarity and environmental policy in the European Union”, Environment and Planning, 32: 1307-1324.

Jordan, A. G. (1997) “ Overcoming the Divide” between Comparative Politics and International Relations Approaches to the EC: What Role for “Post-Decisional Politics?”, West European Politics, 20(4): 43-70.

Knill, C. (2001) The Europeanisation of National Administrations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Peters, B. G. (1988) Comparing Public Bureaucracies: Problems of Theory and Method, Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.

Riskin, A. (2002) “Pskov's 'draught': Border region forgotten by the federal authorities”, Independent Gazette.

www.kaskad-info.ru (2002) Radicalism no longer in fashion.

www.rosbalt.ru (2002) According to the governor of Pskov region Evgeniy Mikhailov political climate of Russian-Estonian relations will most likely continue to warm up.

Yee, A. S. (1996) “The Casual Effect of Ideas on Policies”, International Organisation, 50(1): 88-92.