Helmut Hubel
Professor
Institute of Political Science
Friedrich Schiller University Jena

The EU and Russia as Partners in the Emerging “European Order”

The Problem of “Order” in World Politics

Politicians and their agents - diplomats, journalists and sometimes also academic scholars - like to speak about ”international order”, “security architecture”, the ”Euro­pean House” and other terms, which suggest international organization and stability. Yet, reality is different. The East-West conflict in the 20^th century, with its “stable” nu­clear deterrence system, was rather an exemption. Since the early 1990’s much has been talked about “the new world order”; yet, faced with one “sole superpower”, en­during old and challenging new conflicts and the threat of transnational terrorism, global order is difficult to identify.

Besides the phenomena of globalisation and new transnational threats, regionalisa­tion has become a major trend of world politics. Particularly the developments in Europe are proof of this: the “deepening” and the “widening” of the EU, the South­east - European Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and the evolving EU-Russia relationship demonstrate the European Union’s growing significance. Today the EU and Russia are important players in the evolving “new European order”. Still, the question is: how important are they and what kind of order can we speak about?

The Problem of Order in Post-Cold War Europe

In his study The Anarchical Society (1977), Hedley Bull asked: “Does order exist in world politics?” His answer was yes, to some degree, depending on circumstan­ces. After a lengthy theoretical debate, Bull identified five key elements of interna­tional order: Three of them stem from the realist (“Hobbesian”) paradigm: balance of power, war and the great powers; two of them from the internationalist (“Grotian”) and the universalist (“Kantian”) schools of thought: international law and diplomacy. Bull’s and the “English school’s” approach, inspired by Otto von Gierke, sought to link re­cent theoretical debates with the century-old “traditions of thought”. Significantly, it is wide enough to include arguments from both realist and “liberal” perspectives.

When applying Bull’s five criteria to post-Cold War Europe, we can draw some im­portant conclusions:

a) Balance of power. After the decisive withdrawals and reductions of military arse­nals both in the former East and West, conventional military force in Europe is no longer a major factor of concern. The relevance of nuclear deterrence has been sig­nificantly reduced; still, it has some residual “re-assurance” function.

b) Great powers: Since 1991 the USA has to be regarded as the “sole superpower” and the major actor in terms of “hard” security also in Europe, as the Balkan peace-enforcement and peace-keeping since 1995 demonstrate. In addition, both the ex­panded NATO-Russia relationship (Rome, May 2002) and the NATO enlargement project (Prague, November 2002) demonstrate the US key role in restructuring the North Atlantic Alliance. The other major actors have to be regarded rather as “me­dium powers”: Russia, France and Great Britain as nuclear powers and Germany as Europe’s biggest economic, non-nuclear “trading state”. Today’s conditions in Europe are qualitatively different from previous times: the Western institutions NATO and the EU serve to “pool” or integrate the major power resources and prevent the re-appear­ance of traditional power rivalries. In terms of great power relations, the evolving NATO-Russia partnership is of particular interest, since it demonstrates the actors’ willingness to engage in a deepened cooperative structure.

c) Traditional inter-state war is no more a political option in Europe, which indeed has become a “zone of peace”. The residual nuclear deterrence continues to serve as a stabilizing factor, while the Western powers and Russia jointly aim at suppressing ethnically inspired war, particularly in the Balkans, and new terrorist threats (including the potential use of weapons of mass destruction).

d) International law and institutions: Russia has become or is becoming an  integral part of the European and international order, as indicated by its permanent membership in the UN Security Council, in the CSCE/OSCE and new memberships in European and inter­national institutions like the Council of Europe, the G-8, and – if the current positive trends continue -  in the WTO. Having joined or planning to join (most of) the major international institutions, Russia is confirming its societal-economic transfor­mation.

e) Diplomacy: In the age of global communication and summit meetings, traditional diplomacy has lost some relevance. Still, the discussions on common norms and rules of behaviour remain an integral part of international and European order (e.g. as the debate on Chechnya indicates). In joining the Council of Europe (1996), Russia formally endorsed European standards of human rights. As Russia’s active par­ticipation in international peace-keeping, e.g. in the Balkans, the Arab-Israeli con­flict and anti-terrorism cooperation – demonstrates, it is now a recognized factor of stability in international and European diplomacy.

The EU and Russia in the new “European order”

The EU, being more than an association of states but no state-like federation, is a peculiar international actor. While its member states still retain some classical func­tions of the nation-state (e.g., individual armies and, two of them, nuclear weapons), most of them have engaged in a deepened integration, transferring their sovereignty – e.g., on foreign trade, agriculture and now also on their currencies – to the EU’s supranational bodies. Despite the difficulties of reaching decisions among the 15 members, the EU managed to significantly increase its importance. Otherwise it would be hard to explain why most European states want to join it, i.e., abide by the acquis communautaire. As a unique “international actor” the EU does not dispose of many traditional means of power. Still, it exerts “soft” power and influence, e.g. by attracting or inducing non-members to deal with it and by setting specific norms and standards.

This observation is of particular interest when analysing the EU-Russia relationship: On the one hand, Russia is dealing with individual EU member states, e.g. the imme­diate neighbour (Finland) or a “special partner” (Germany); on the other hand, Russia is increasingly being affected by the EU’s economic standards and activities and, since the late 1990’s increasingly, by the implications of the EU’s Eastern enlarge­ment. Faced with the prospect of gaining  three new EU members as immediate neighbors (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and of Kaliningradskaia Oblast to become completely sur­rounded by EU members (Lithuania and Poland) after 2004, Russia has recognized the necessity to deal with the EU and to work out practical arrangements.

When comparing this new situation with the conditions of only 15 years ago, we can grasp the essence of the “new order” in Europe: Gone is the “logic of military power” and geopolitical reasoning; instead, the “logic of economic and political integration” is prevalent. Significantly, while the previous ”order” was dominated by Soviet military power and the ideology of socialism, it is now the EU which is defining some impor­tant elements of the European “rules of the game”. It seems that the recent debates between the EU and Russia stem from this very fact, which indeed warrants “new thinking”.

Challenges for the EU-Russia Relationship

As Russia’s most important trading partner (with increasing imports of Russian energy resources), the EU has become an indispensable source of revenues. Also, when assessing other neighbourhood relationships (e.g., with Japan, China, Central and South Asia, and the Caucasus) one can argue that the enlarging EU is providing Russia with a politically stable and economically challenging but also promising environment. Both the EU’s “deepening” and “widening” have already had or promise to have significant importance for Russia. The European Monetary Union, with the in­troduction of the Euro in 12 member states, strengthens the EU’s role as one of the global economic and financial players. The negotiations on membership with 10 East-Central European states demonstrate the EU’s willingness to develop into an all-European Union. The introduction of the acquis communautaire in these post-social­ist or even post-Soviet countries will confirm their fundamental political-economical-social transition.

For Russia, the consequences are obvious: in addition to Finland, it will gain more neighbouring EU countries and will thereby be increasingly forced to deal with the EU’s norms and practises. Also, if the expectations in rapid economic growth in the new EU member states will continue to materialize, Russia will be faced with an increased danger of “falling back”. Kaliningradskaia Oblast, not the most prosperous of today’s Russian regions, might become an acute problem of social-economic backwardness. As the recent controversies about a “special status” for the Kaliningraders after the intro­duction of the Schengen regime in Lithuania and Poland demonstrate, there is the need for practical solutions. From the point of view of the EU countries, particularly those partici­pating in the Schengen regime, any “special arrangement” violating the acquis com­munautaire should be avoided. Still, as the Commission’s recent proposal (18 September 2002) indicates, the EU is determined to work out a compromise.

In concluding a Partnership Agreement in 1994, the EU has demonstrated its deter­mination not to exclude Russia from the process of “Eastern enlargement”. Still, the EU has made it clear, that further increased cooperation will depend on Russia’s ability to comply with the international and the EU’s trade standards. Particulalry Russia’s joining of the World Trade Organization would pave the way for a deepened re­lationship with the EU.

Summary and Outlook

The EU and Russia are two major partners in the evolving “new European order”. While the U.S. plays the key role in NATO-related issues, the EU has become the major actor, defining the economic-financial and increasingly also certain (“soft”) security-re­lated “rules of the game” (such as migration issues and crime prevention). Russia as the immediate neighbour of the enlarged Union will, on the one hand, profit from the EU’s economic attractiveness; on the other, it will have to adapt to the norms and standards, as defined by the EU’s acquis communautaire. An EU-Russian compromise on the Kaliningrad issue will demonstrate that a deepened partnership can be achieved.