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Katlijn Malfliet
Institute of International and European Policy
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

The European Union and Russia: towards a Common Strategy?

Introduction

Institutional theory learns that institutions have a rather large capability to adapt themselves to changing conditions in their internal organization or in their external relations [1]. This was obviously the case for the European Union, an institution which in its move towards further integration successfully managed to combine divergent expectancies of its member states with the need to develop a common policy. The history of the European Union shows that in EU internal policy matters, it was always possible to find a compromise between the interests of the member states and the need to come to a joint decision. The so-called communitarian method was a success in EU internal decision making.

Confronted with the need to streamline its foreign policy, the European Union sought inspiration in its domestic decision making procedures. The idea was to apply the above mentioned successful method of seeking compromises between member states to the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. Common strategies of the European Council were conceived to add a strategic dimension to the common foreign policy of the European Union, which had hitherto been lacking. This was indeed the way in which the common stategy towards Russia came into being.

Development of EU Foreign Policy Making

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the European Union sought for an answer to the challenge of establishing new relations with its neighbors. The European Union could hardly follow the growing ambitions of its new post-communist partners on the European continent. Bilateral treaties, such as the Trade and Cooperation Agreements soon appeared not to answer the ambitions of the post-communist countries. In this sense the story of the relation between the European Union and the post-communist countries reflects the story of European integration. Ambitions to reach a sustainable foreign policy can be found in the original treaties in the fact that important powers were conferred to the community in the field of development cooperation and foreign trade. Early attempts to come to a common European political cooperation, such as the European Defence Community, the European Political Community in 1954 and the Fouchet plan in 1961 failed. In 1970 European Political Cooperation came into being as a rather procedural cooperation link, which found its legal consolidation in the Single European Act of 1986. Notwithstanding the tension between national interests and common interest, which was so typical for the intergovernmental character of early cooperation, consultations on all levels in the framework of European Political Cooperation “created the feeling of a diplomatic club, where contradictions of the intergovernmental procedure faded”[2].

However, in its foreign policy towards a disintegrated post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe, the European Union soon had to admit its weakness. The European initiatives in the former Yugoslavia failed. The strenghtening of the European Political Cooperation by the Single European Act did not seem to be sufficient. The treaties of Maastricht (1991) and Amsterdam (1996) had to overcome this problem by introducing new procedures, which, be it partially, introduced decision-making based on qualified majority voting. The Intergovernmental Conference of 1996 was intended to correct the failures of Maastricht, but again failed to bring real solutions to an increasing problem. The Union’s external relations were divided between the Union’s predominantly intergovernmental second pillar, in which decision making by unanimous agreement prevailed and where the difficulties inherent to a union of fifteen states, most of them jealous of their sovereignty, remained, and the first, the community pillar, where qualified majority voting normally applies and where the commission has a key role. It became clear that it would be absurd to divorce European foreign policy from the institutions which have been given responsibility for most of the instruments for its accomplishment: for external trade questions, including sanctions; for European external assistance; for many of the external aspects of Justice and Home affairs. The Amsterdam Treaty came up with an institutional answer: it introduced a secretariat and a secretary general as new institutions and three new instruments: common strategies, common actions and common positions. These new instruments, which introduced qualified majority voting in the second pillar, had to induce a pro-active and strategic policy.

Common Strategies

The Amsterdam Treaty of the European Union of 1997 introduced the common strategy as a new instrument for European foreign policy, more in particular for European Common Foreign and Security Policy. The common strategy was initially perceived by the scientific world as a remarkable and ingenious tool, in that it is both part of the EU’s external relations and an internal institutional innovation [3]. Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam indeed explains that the drafting process of the common strategy is based on a common denominator, derived from the national interests of the member states: “The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the member states have important interests in common. Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and means to be made available by the Union and the member states. The Council shall recommend common strategies and shall implement them, in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions”. In this way the common strategy, as a technique, represented an innovation in EU external institution building, aiming at a delicate balance between intergovernmentalism and federal ambitions in the second pillar. The idea was to decouple broad strategic decisions based on unanimity from smaller tactical steps, approved by qualified majority voting. Common Strategies were perceived as agreements between the member states and the European Council, which are meant to streamline the Union’s CFSP mechanisms, to integrate the activities of the individual member states and to introduce qualified majority voting in the Council. This is why the procedure of drafting a common strategy was called the “Christmas tree method”: the Council defines the general lines and afterwards each individual country can hang some “ornaments” expressing its own national interests (for example cooperation in the field of trade, ecological protection, high technology) [4].

At the Vienna Summit in 1998 the European Council decided to devise common strategies on Russia, Ukraine, the Mediterranean, and the Balkans, geographically speaking, “the borderlands of the European Union”, a kind of “Near Abroad” for the enlarged European Union. The Common Strategy on Russia was adopted first in June 1999[5]; the Common Strategy on Ukraine followed some six months later on 11 December 1999 [6]. Both were adopted for a period of four years and soon have to be revised. The Common Strategy on the Mediterranean region is the third strategy of its kind and was adopted on 19 June 2000 [7]. These common strategies suffer from similar general problems, but we will concentrate in our paper on the common strategy on Russia and its effects and implications for international relations and geopolitics.

The first EU common strategy was aimed at the Russian Federation. By doing this, the member states did express their intention to come to a strategic partnership with the most important continental partner of the Union. Previously, the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1994 was presented as the keystone of a new strategic approach of the European Union towards Russia [8]. However, with the outbreak of the first Chechen War, it became clear that European Common Foreign and Security Policy did not dispose of enough instruments to influence Russia. The Common Strategy towards Russia was presented as complementary to the Partnership and Cooperation Treaty, certainly not replacing the latter. In this way, the Partnership and Cooperation Treaty and the Common Strategy remain until now the most important building blocks of the relation between the Union and Russia. This relation is intrinsically bound with developments within the second pillar of the European construction.

Critical Observations

The initial optimism with the common strategy was bound to fade, it was soon replaced by critical observations: the individual member states were not in favour to leave the consensus rule, the common strategies reiterated the words of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, they did not add much to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, and thus could not be called strategic [9]. One of the most important – down to earth – reasons for these flaws is that no additional budget was provided for implementing the common strategy. Moreover, several individual member states appeared not to be willing to accept qualified majority voting in the implementation of foreign policy strategies. The common strategy was one-sided, it was told, more a tactical instrument for compromise between the member states than a strategic instrument for foreign policy.

This uneasiness about the Common Strategies of the Council became in particular clear when, in the autumn of 2000 the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, asked by the General Affairs Council, submitted an evaluation report on the operation and possible improvement of the existing common strategies. Solana was rather straight in his criticism identifying the gap between poor effectiveness on the one hand and the expectations raised by the common strategies on the other hand. The common strategies, according to Solana, had not yet contributed to a stronger and more effective European Union in international affairs [10].

The report criticises the limited value of the Common Strategy as an internal working tool, in particular in sensitive crisis situations, and the uncertainty as to how the common strategies relate to the already existing instruments, most notably the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements. The prospect of qualified majority voting decisions was singled out as a reason for making member states more reluctant to engage with the common strategies. The presidencies’ work plans were referred to by Solana as “routine exercises” and “inventories of existing policies and activities”.

Solana’s report asks for the common strategies to be turned into primarily internal EU policy documents, to be more selective in scope and contain “verifiable objectives” against which progress can be measured and on the basis of which member states could promote the common strategies in other international institutions. The common strategy is essentially meant to be an intergovernmental framework by means of which individual member states are reasserting their say in EU foreign policy, Mr Solana underscored.

Afterwards, the European Parliament expressed its support for both the common strategies and Solana’s conclusions about the need to make the documents more credible and ensure realistic means for their implementation [11].

Perhaps Solana’s criticism was even not far reaching enough, as a more fundamental question remains open: how “common” and how “strategic” is a common strategy of the European Council anyhow? The commonality of the strategy, if there is any, only resides in the fact that the EU internally tries to seek a solution for divided approaches within its own organisation. A common strategy does not rely on a consensus between partners, on the contrary. Common strategies are unilaterally conceived by the European Union without participation or advice of the target country. Russia was not involved in the redaction and negotiation of the common strategy. Moreover, there is not much strategic in the common strategy: instead of becoming a policy blueprint, the common strategy tends to become a policy substitute: the gap between the wording of the document and real politics became a symptom of the deficit of common foreign policy within EU internal policy making [12]. One can conclude that this stategy is mistakenly called a “common strategy”.The foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation does not even mention the EU Common Strategy towards Russia [13].

At the end, the crucial question becomes whether this unilateral behaving by the European Union towards third countries was harmful for the aim of establishing balanced relations on the European continent?

Russia’s Answer

A few months after the adoption of EU’s common strategy towards Russia, Russia came with its own medium-term strategy towards the European Union [14]. Although generally accepting the wording of EU’s common strategy, Russia presented itself as an indignated partner, claiming to be taken seriously as the main trade partner with the European Union and as the most important and leading member state of the Commonwealth of Independent States [15]. In this way one can talk about a two-headed foreign policy profile, formulated by Russia towards the European Union. On the one hand Russia accepted the conditionality formulated by the European Union, but on the other hand it presented itself as claiming a leading role within the CIS and asking the European Union to sustain this role and not to interfere by establishing bilateral relations with the New Independent States of the CIS.

It is often forgotten that Russia formulated its own strategy towards the New Independent States of the CIS as early as 1995, be in in the form of a presidential decree [16]. In this decree Russia constructs, institutionalises and legitimises its geopolitical influence on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

This approach can be qualified as specific for Russia. Ukraine’s docility in this field for example strongly contrasts with the ambivalent attitude of Russia. The reaction of Ukraine to the EU common strategy towards its own country did not show that two-layered structure (on the one hand accepting conditionality, on the other imposing its own strategy, as Russia did). Ukraine was well prepared to answer in an enthousiastic way to the EU common strategy. In a decree “On the Stategy of Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union” of 11 June 1998, following the ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation Treaty, President Kuchma singled out EU membership as Ukraine’s strategic goal, and associate membership as a mid-term foreign policy objective [17]. But the European Union appeared to be a cool lover, becoming tired of all this activity and adding only a few of Ukraine’s detailed suggestions to the “wish list”.

Perspectives for a EU-Russia Common Strategy

The question remains whether the European Union and Russia can evolve in their relation towards a real common strategy: a relation that deserves the qualification of “common” and “strategic”?

One can strongly doubt whether it is possible to develop sustainable commonality in the strategic orientation of Russian and EU foreign policy. The Russian Medium Term Strategy clearly illustrates that Russia’s ambitions are by priority within the Commonwealth of Independent States, where Russia claims a leadership role. Besides, one cannot deny that EU enlargement creates a situation of opposed interests between the European Union on the one hand, claiming the closing of its external borders in the framework of Schengen regulations, and Russia on the other hand, claiming a free trade zone in the real sense of the word, implying permeability of the borders. The Kaliningrad issue can be considered as the mythological dimension of this problem of interest opposition. NATO enlargement is even more problematic in this puicture of shifting geopolitical influence zones, as the second round of enlargement plans to include the Baltic states, three former Union Republics of the Soviet Union.

If a common strategy is difficult to imagine, can we then direct our ambitions towards a strategic partnership?

Towards a Strategic Partnership?

A strategic partnership on the European continent between Russia and the European Union is necessary and possible. It is necessary because, if such a partnership is not defined in time, the fear can rise that Europe will once again become a geopolitical playground for the US, Russia itself and who knows which important international player will come to the fore. The way NATO enlargement is constructed and imposed upon Europe by the US is only one example of this problematic relation. The European Union needs its own strategy, it has to define its own strategic partnership with Russia. Emancipation from US geopolitical dependency is in Europe’s interest.

The stretched concept of strategic partnership is included in the texts of EU common strategies as “based on shared values and common interests, as a vital factor enhancing peace, stability and prosperity in Europe”. The reality, however, is far away from this ideal. The institutional threat of an expectations-implementation gap is much worse than one would expect. In particular because of that threat the critique of Mr Javier Solana does not reach far enough, because it merely touches upon the symptoms of an underlying disease: it does not remediate the problems.The critique needs to be framed and contextualised in a historical and geographic context. A more specific and more workable strategy is needed, even if it is necessary to start from scratch in order to obtain that goal.

Framing a Strategic Partnership between Russia and the European Union

The following elements can in our view be considered as fundamental in the framing of a real and sustainable strategic partnership:

1) Both partners need to know each other and to accept each other’s identity. This is rather problematic as the identity of both is in a state of flux. It is not clear how Russia will develop its political identity. It appears that Russia’s foreign policy, domestic politics and public awareness are still separate domains, in particular with regard to Russia’s’s westward orientation towards the European Union. While a number of official documents demonstrate a degree of political will at the top level of decision making in Russia, the implementation of the decisions is lagging behind. The best example for this is the requirement of foreign direct investors on the establishment of a reliable rule of law, including proper corporate governance. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Tacis programme increasingly put emphasis on the legal, administrative and human infrastructure required for a successful market economy. Even with a good understanding of Russian conditions, it is almost impossible to transplant a western concept of the rule of law to Russia. On the other hand the European Union is also looking for further delineation of its own identity, still hesitating between its federal ambitions and its intergovernmental realities. Hopefully, the Convention will bring some insights in European choices.

2) The EU Common Strategy towards Russia does not mention problems arising from the process of EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, a process that influences the relations between Russia and the EU in many ways. The possible impact of enlargement on EU-Russia relations came high on the agenda of the regular dialogue between the European Commission and the Russian authorities in the relevant bodies of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, while this was not the case from the start[18]. The candidate countries were in their turn invited to associate themselves with actions under the EU Common Strategy towards Russia. Central and East European applicants should use their knowledge of Russia in ways that will help to smooth relations during the process of enlargement and to build the EU-Russia partnership. In principle they are well placed to make a constructive contribution to this relationship, but will that be the case in practice? For applicant countries that share the borders with Russia, high standards of frontier controls are crucial. The Polish government has already decided that it will impose a visa requirement on citizens from Ukraine, Russia and Belarus from July 2003. In this way the question of borders becomes a matter of interest opposition: protection of borders is essential for EU policies relating to Schengen measures and the safeguarding of the acquis communautaire, while Russia and other outsiders argue for penetrability of borders. Kaliningrad is once again an illustration of this tormenting question of frontiers [19]. By proposing that Kaliningrad become a pilot region for cooperation, through a special programme of visas, corridors, and promotion of assistance and investment aiming at economic and social development of the region, Russia points at EU’s contradictory policy: proclaiming liberalisation of trade on the one hand and on the other hand taking protectionist measures, aiming at trade protection and effective action against cross-border crime [20].

3) The European Union’s institutions and its decision making process are still not adequate to accomplish the tasks of establishing a partnership with Russia, and more in general to design the relationship that the European Union should have to the wider world. The European Union itself is in need of a common position on its Near Abroad (i.e. third countries after the EU enlargement). The European Union should look beyond accession negotiations, trying to integrate the enlargement process on the one hand and its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on the other. The European Union should in its external relations “clean up its procedures, make decisions more quickly, and come to terms with the basic issues of democracy and accountability”. Ukraine borders four candidate countries (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania): their frontiers with Ukraine will make the EU’s future Eastern external border. However, it is mainly in the framework of the (bilateral) PCA bodies that the dialogue on the consequences of EU enlargement continues, including the movement of people, goods and services between the EU and Ukraine. The Northern Dimension project, conceived to foster a wide range of co-operation among states around the Baltic area, which includes two present and four future members as well as Russia, with special reference to its North-Western Region together with Kalingrad, resulted in disappointment because of lacking resources to putting substance in it: the Union’s South did not like to see resources diverted. The Northern and Southern dimensions of CFSP need to be linked in order to avoid destructive rivalry between different regional groups of member states.

4) The Common European Economic Area and a free trade area with Russia, as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement puts it, remain wishful thinking. The EU should do more to liberalise its steel and agricultural sectors and to improve its anti-dumping procedures. Russia is in particular concerned about the consequences of applying EU antidumping legislation in candidate countries after their accession [21]. This problem will at least partially be answered by the recognition of Russia as a market economy, which strongly influences the concrete implementation of anti-dumping procedures [22]. Nevertheless, disagreements on the implementation of antidumping measures are once again an illustration of the internal contradictions of EU-functioning: on the one hand the European Union proclaims free market and competition principles, but on the other hand it behaves as a protectionist “economic fortress” [23]. Within this economùic dialogue, the EU-Russia Energy Partnership is of major importance [24]. The European Union becomes increasingly dependent on Russia as to oil and gas imports. Not only should a secure framework be assured for the massive investments, but also this interdependency should receive an institutional framing.

6) The strategic partnership between the European Union and Russia contains important aspects of international security. In this sense European enlargement should be considered in close connection with the ongoing process of NATO-enlargement. Ukraine openly formulated its intention to become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Cooperation (NATO). On the other hand, it does not want to interrupt good neighbourhood relations with Russia.

7) European enlargement and CIS-building can both be considered as having their own logic, the one in many ways excluding the other. A critical dialogue on all totalizing identity moves of both sides is needed [25].

Continuing Bilateral Relations between Russia and Individual EU Member States

One has to admit that the non-committal status quo as to EU foreign policy suits many member states. The Union’s trade policy seeks to support Russian integration into the European and international economy. But behind this trade policy, bilateral relations are continued. Member states have focused on bilateral contacts rather than on EU-Russia relations. These bilateral contacts should not be developed at the expense of the relationship between Russia and the Union as a whole: “Governments are not being realistic if they seek to form satisfactory partnerships with Russia separately, or to concentrate power exclusively in the Council, instead of recognising the potential of the Community system as the framework to work effectively towards the aims to which they committed themselves when they agreed on the common strategy” [26].

Let us take the example of Belgium. Belgium and Russia can rely on an interesting and challenging history of bilateral relations. Belgium always took the position that Russia was too large to “embrace”, but nevertheless it always played a hidden role of pioneer between the colleagues of the European Union. Pierre Harmel launched a new approach towards the former East Bloc by promoting dialogue between East and West, primarily within the United Nations. At the same time he stenghtened the possibilities of economic cooperation with Russia for Belgian industries. Harmel was not the only one who aimed at an enriched foreign policy with Belgium in a pioneer role. Another Belgian politician, Guy Coëme started in 1989 with a bilateral military dialogue with the Warsaw Pact countries. These talks were preceded by bilateral negotiations on defence with the Soviet Union. This time not in the framework of the United Nations, but because Belgium, and first of all the Ministry of Defence, wanted to follow its own policy within NATO. By this, Belgium positioned itself within the discussion on the European level between the so-called atlantists and the protagonists of a European military voice in international relations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs kept on playing the atlantist role, while the Defence tried to stimulate a European initiative through national initiatives. However, the enormous bilateral activity between Belgium and the Soviet Union seems to almost have stopped since the coming into being of the Russian Federation [27]. For the time being, there are no important policial initiatives as well. One exception: recently the Belgian prime minister Guy Verhofstadt wrote a letter to NATO and US Parliament to announce that a European defence identity was necesssary and unavoidable, as citizens could not be stimulated any more to pay for NATO defence expenditures. France and Great Brittain immediately reacted to this message, saying that they strongly opposed to this point of view.

To assess Belgian foreign policy towards Russia one has to take into account the division of labour between the federal government and the regions and communities. Their involvement in European affairs is regulated by the friendship and cooperation agreement between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Russian Federation of 1993 [28]. Interesting are art. 6 and 7, where both parties besides contacts on international and European level, also want to cooperate bilaterally on political and technical questions. The treaty stipulates that parties will regularly consult each other on actual themes (art. 6) and inform each other at the military level via military delegations and exchange of points of view. The implementation remains vague. However, the so-called “mixed commission” between Belgium and Russia still functions and continues bilateral trade negotations and the establishment of a bilateral trade policy, notwithstanding the fact that trade policy clearly situates itself within the first pillar, where the European Union takes over from the member states on the supranational level. The least one can say is that the so-called spill-over effect was not fully realised in this domain. The Direction “European integration and coordination” at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the coordination of points of view of federal and member states in the Council and in general within the European Union.

Undoubtedly, the Belgian interest fror Russia can be stimulated through EU foreign policy initiatives. Russia has been removed as a priority country by the Flemish government and the focus shifted to the candidate accession states to the European Union [29]. On the Belgian level Russia is named as a priority country beside Canada, Argentinia and South Korea, be it as first of all an economic priority [30].

From the Belgian experience it becomes clear that in building its partnership with Russia the Union should make a clear choice for CFSP, moving towards majority voting and adequate competences for the commission (as it was asked in the framework of the Convention), together with sufficient budgetary support.

Towards an Enhanced Partnership?

A major element in a broad-based European security policy must be the building of a partnership with Russia. The question is whether this should lead in the long run to “embedding Russia in a Euro-Atlantic security community” and to NATO becoming a quite different institution – in effect a “pan-European security organisation”. According to US foreign policy views, the logic of this process “leads to the point where it can only be completed by including Russia” [31]. However, the European Union should be worried about this evolution, become aware that in this field it has no identical interests with the US in NATO and EU-enlargement, and decide on its own strategic approach to this complex issue.

All these aspects point towards the impossibility to sustain a strategic partnership between Russia and an enlarged European Union [32]. Whatever nice wordings are used: the strategic partnership will remain an assymetric partnership, dominated by EU conditionality and economic interests, as long as it will not be seen in the context of a broader view on the role that the European Union but also Russia can play in world politics [33]. For example, in the field of European security the joining of Ukraine to the West, would be received by Russia as impinging on its own security [34].

This problem is not recent, it goes back to the moment when communism finally imploded in the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. At that moment the principle of international liberalism was declared to guide the New Independent States, which came out of the Soviet Union. Instead of changing the pan-European institutional framework now that Cold War had disappeared, all western institutions of the Cold War remained intact (Council of Europe, West European Union, European Union, NATO), while the communist, East European transnational cooperation structures disintegrated (Communist Party, Soviet Federation, Warsaw Pact). The only pan-European institution that was established during the Cold War, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) appeared to be weak in its structure and decision-making power.

All these Western institutions started their own enlargement processes, rather disconnected from each other, the one with more speed and conviction than the other, the one impeding or too much enforcing the other. Furthermore, these post-Cold War Western institutions can go for different and contradicting agendas: NATO enlargement and EU enlargement are probably not driven by the same motivation.

But after the implosion of communism, all those “Cold War style” European institutions were confronted with the problem of institutional identity and with the legitimation of their own functioning. For all of them, conditionality became of major importance: conditionality for membership was important to guarantee their identity and the effectiveness of their institution, to define the “ins and the outs”. That is for example why the “acquis communautaire” and the Schengen conditions became so important for EU accession talks. In any case the European Union, by following its enlargement process, will face the problem of “institutional stretching”, making it increasingly difficult for the European Union to operate in an efficient and consistent way.

Looking less Eurocentric at this development, the new geopolitical situation can be approached as follows: Europe now has to deal with two Near Abroads. On the East European side of the continent, the Commonwealth of Independent States is continuously changing its appearance: regional cooperation structures within the CIS, such as the Eurasian Economic Union and the security and defence cooperation, based on the treaty of Tashkent, appear to be rapidly developing structures. The relation between Russia and Belarus is constantly taking on other appearances: from a confederal structure to a federal union and recently even the eventuality of absorption of Belarus within the Russian state structure has come to the fore. Ukraine, another example, was not unequivocal as to its relation towards the CIS: on the one hand it was among the founders of the CIS in the treaty of Minsk and on the other, Ukraine showed itself to be a reluctant partner refusing to reiterate its role as “Malorossiia”. Together with the news that president Leonid Kuchma made from European integration the core idea for his “State of the Union” speech before the Ukrainian Parliament, the news was launched that Ukraine plans to join the Eurasian Economic Union and signed an encompassing treaty with the Russian Federation a few months before. These events made clear that Ukraine is in a particular position between the European Union and Russia. Ukraine’s multi-vector policy is confusing and was never clearly defined. Anyway it is important to frame the rapidly changing developments in the foreign policy of the New Independent States within two fields of concentric circles: on the one hand the European Union and its extending Near Abroad (the accession countries) and on the other hand Russia and its Near Abroad (the CIS countries) [35].

The upcoming doctrine since 11 September 2001 on the fight against terrorism strongly adds to the Putin doctrine of pragmatic realism, that cements and furthers Moscow’s interests in this part of the world. The West should realise that within the CIS a sophisticated game of imitation has been brought into place: the CIS disposes of its own rapid intervention forces, its own Convention for Human Rights, its own Economic Court, all institutions that would be superfluous if there were a real intention towards pan-European integration.

Instead of a Common Strategy or a Partnership: Building Bricks for a Safe and Stable World System

A common strategy between Russia and the European Union should be framed in the broader framework of the new geopolitical context. The relation of an integrating Europe with the US and US dominated international institutions is relevant in this aspect. The best example is EU monetary policy, where the EU has been slow to prepare a common external monetary policy and did not make much progress in forming a common policy in the international monetary institutions. The importance of the Euro should be reflected in the Union’s external monetary policies towards Russia, including the influence in the international institutions. “The influence of the United States on Russian macroeconomic policy and on the IMF has often been misconceived. Europeans, being closer to Russia and more aware of their interest in its succes, should acquire at least as much influence in this field as the US. More liberalisation is required where import restrictions remain. An equal partnership with the United States, based on Union powers and institutions sufficient for that purpose in all fields other than defence, would be a basis for such a policy (to promote security and stability in the wider world), with the Americans playing the predominant part in the field of hard security and the Europeans in that of soft security” [36].

Europeans indeed should be active in the field of soft security, forging the partnership with Russia through common action in matters such as peace-keeping, climate change and the fight against terrorism and organised crime, together with a massive porogramme of assistance to help Russia complete its transformation into a mature market economy and pluralist democracy, a project to which the Union has a unique interest and a potential capability [37]. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development works on improving the conditions for direct foreign investment, and it needs support from the member states and from their representatives in the board. The Tacis programme tries to mobilise human and financial resources to establish the framework for a better market economy [38].

But foremost, the European Union should try to understand Russian foreign policy, and approach Russia within its own Near Abroad. Western Europe should not merely consider Russia as a state in the modern sense of the word. Common action against terrorism was prominent in the Russian Medium Term Strategy, but not in the Union’s common strategy. Cooperation in this field became of major importance on the CIS agenda long before 11 September 2001. EU-Russia partnership became afterwards even more crucial for the future security of Europe and of the world as a whole, as is reflected in the emphasis given to political and security cooperation in the joint Statement of the EU-Russia Summit in October 2001.

Pragmatic realism from the point of view of the European Union would include a fundamental understanding of the “otherness” of Russia, in whatever terms this would be understood, but in any case translating the underlying idea that Russia, for its own identity building, needs Europe as the other.

In that case the European Union should explore a partnership with Russia and its Near Abroad, that fully takes into account the Eurasian geopolical mission of Russia, and that could counterbalance American unilateralism. Western Europe (the European Union) should be recognised by both great powers and it should be consulted by them, but it should keep its own identity and take seriously such concepts as democracy, market, and above all a broad security concept on the European continent.

References

[1] B. Dente and F. Kjellberg (eds.), The Dynamics of Institutional Change, London, Sage publications, 1988.

[2] W. Wessels, Der Europäische Rat, Europa Union Verlag, Bonn, 1980, p.8.

[3] “The Common Strategy is a curious beast residing both in the realm of EU external relations and the internal debates and conflicts over the institutional structure of the Union. The Common Strategy on Russia is one of the first attempts at operationalising the European discourse on foreign policy, both internally and externally”, S. Medvedev and H. Haukkala, “Learning the Grammar of CFSP” in: S. Medvedev and H. Haukkala (eds.), The EU Common Strategy on Russia. Learning the Grammar of CFSP, Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, N°11, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs (Helsinki) and the Institut für Europäische Politik, Berlin, 2001, p.14.

[4] Ibidem, p.20.

[5] Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia. In : Official Journal of the European Communities, L 157, 24 June 1999, http:ue.int/pesc.asp.

[6] Common Strategy of the European Union on Ukraine. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ ceeca/com_strat/index.htm.

[7] Common Strategy for the Mediterranean and Reinviogorating the Barcelona Process: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/speech_01_49.htm

[8] COMMISSION Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/index.htm, June 24th, 1994.

[9] Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Russia and the European Union, signed on 24 June 1994, COM (94) 257 final, 94/0151 (AVC), PB (1997) L327

[10] Secretary General/High Representative: Common Strategies Report, Brussels, 21 December 2000, declassified 30 January 2001, 14 871/00, CAB 21.

[11] European Parliament Resolution on the Common Strategy of the European Union on Ukraine (C5-0208/2000-2000/2116/COS, 28 February 2001).

[12] Council of the European Union, doc. 10718/01. The European Union’s Common Strategy on Russia, Belgian Presidency Work Plan. Document 10718/01 (Annex), http://ue.eu.int/en/presid.htm; Council report to the European Council on the Implementation of the Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia, 14 juin 2000, document 9405/00; http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/newmain.asp?lang=1; Presidency’ Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia, 7 December 1999, document 13009/1/99, ibidem.

[13] THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF RUSSIA The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. www.mid.ru/mid/eng/econcept.htm, April 12th. 2001.

[14] COMMISSION Russia’s response to the Common Strategy of the European Union of 4 June 1999: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russian_medium_term_strategy/ December 12th 2002.

[15] “Strategiia razvitiia otnoshenii rossiiskoi federatsii s evropeiskim soiuzom na srednesrochnuiu perspektivu (2000-2010g)”, Diplomaticheskii Vestnik, n°11, November 1999, p.20.

[16] In September 1995 a presidential decree was published: “On Russia’s Strategic Policy Towards the Commonwealth of Independent States”. This decree is positioning Russia as the leading force in a new system of economic and political relations and as the major force promoting the CIS integration process. The new policy asserted that concerted efforts had to be taken, to position the CIS as a leading regional organisation, which can enter into sweeping cooperation with leading international forums and organisations: Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Documents, Data and Analysis, Z.Brzezinski and others (ed.), Sharpe, New York, 1997, p. 766.

[17] “Prezident Leonid Kuchma: Kurs na evrointegratsiiu iavliaetsia estestvennym sledstviem obreteniia Ukrainoi nezavisimosti”(President Leonid Kuchma: The Way towards European Integration is the immediate consequence of the fact that Ukraine became independent), Fakty, 1/6/2002, p.2.

[18] “We noted with satisfaction the continuation of dialogue within the PCA bodies on the consequences of EU enlargement, including the movement of people, goods and services between the EU and Ukraine” Joint communiqué after the fourth EU/Ukraine summit in Yalta: Uniting Europe, n°157, 17/09/2001

[19] COMMISSION Communication from the Commission to the Council “The EU and Kaliningrad, January 17th, 2001. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_dim/kalin/index.htm, October 29th 2001.

[20] J. Baxendale, S. Dewar and D. Gowan, The EU and Kaliningrad. Kaliningrad and the Impact of EU Enlargement, Kogan Page Ltd., Federal Trust for Education and Research, Londoin, 2000, 288pp.

[21] COMMISSION Russia: General Features of Trade Policy. Market Access Sectoral and Trade Barriers Database. http://mkaccdb.eu.int/mkdb/chksel.pl, November 8th 2001.

[22] Provisional anti-dumping duties have also been imposed on the Czech republic, Poland and Ukraine, as well as Turkey and Thailand, announcement published in the EU Official Journal L83 of 27 March 2002.

[23] COMMISSION Implementation of the EU/Russia Common Strategy: EU Trade Policy Priorities in the Short to Medium Term. http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade, December 22nd, 2001.

[24] The EU-Russia Partnership: http: //www.europa.eu.int/comm/enrgy_transport/en/lpi_en_3.html, February 11th, 2002. Towards an EU-Russia Energy Partnership. Presentation by Christian Clkeutinx Head of Unit. Warsaw, March 21st, 2002: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/energy_transport/russia/partnership_en.pdf, April 9th, 2002.

[25] K. Malfliet, The Commonwealth of Independent States: Russian Ambitions Disguised in a European (Eurasian) Project?”, in: Is Russia a Euroipean Power. The Position of Russia in a New Europe, Leuven University Press, Leuven, 1998, 91-129.

[26] John Pinder, “EU-Russia Partnership as a pillar for Building a Safe and Stable World System”, in: John Pinder and Yuri Shishkov, The EU and Russia: The Premise of Partnership, London, The Federal Trust, 2002, 45.

[27] Third country summary files.Russia; http://ue.eu.int/pesc/default.asp.

[28] Belgisch Staatsblad (Official Monitor), 1998-03-10.

[29] http://www.vlaanderen.be/channels/hoofdmenu/vlaanderenint/.

[30] Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://213.53.163.218.

[31] Dmitri Trenin, “A Russian Perspective”, in: Trenin and Van Hamm, Russia and the United States, p.39-40; Lawrence Freedman, “The Transformation of NATO”, Financial Times 6 August 2001.

[32] H. Timmermann, “European-Russian Partnership: What Future?”in: European Foreign Affairs Review, Issue 2, Number 5, Summer 2000, 165-174.

[33] COMMISSION Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006. National Indicative Programme 2002-2003. Russian Federation. 27 December 2001; http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/csp/index.htm, April 11th, 2002; COMMISSION, EU-Russia summit. Joint Statementr (October 3rd, 2001; http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/summit/, December 20th, 2001.

[34] J. Gower, “The EU and Russia: the Challenge of Integration without Accession”, in: J. Gower and J. Redmond (eds.), Enlarging the European Union. The Way Forward, Ashgate, Aldershot-Vermont, p. 163-177.

[35] P. Fraser, “Russia, the CIS and the European Community: building a relationship”in: N. Malcolm (ed.) Russia and Europe: An End to Confrontation? The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Pinter publishers, London-New York, 1994, 199-223.

[36] John Pinder, “EU-Russia Partnership as a Pillar for Building a Safe and Stable World system” in: John Pinder and Yuri Shishkov, The EU and Russia: the Premise of Partnership, London, The Federal Trust, 2002, 142.

[37] Ibidem.

[38] John Pinder, “EU-Russia Partnership”, 135-142.