by Jörgen Lundqvist, LL.M., member of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm
Paper presented at the St. Petersburg City Seminar on European Studies, European Documentation Centre in St. Petersburg / School of International Relations of the St. Petersburg State University, 8 December 1999
On the threshold of the 21st century it has been a popular trend to summarise and evaluate the past hundred years. What will be the lasting picture of the 1900s when more human beings than ever before in the history of Man have fallen victim to wars, frightening ideas of master races, Lebensraum for the privileged and concentration camps for undesirables, ethnical cleansing, starvation, area bombing, Communist hostage-taking of nations – the first one being Russia, anti-Semitism but also misguided threat perceptions and their consequences? [1]
Some historians have presented the case that this Century is already over and seen as a logical process the century began in 1914 and ended in 1989.[2] Well, then we are already climbing the first stairs of a new world.
Taking a positive view of the future my only personal wish is that the associations of the first visit to the moon in 1969, - what was intended to be a giant leap for mankind and the breaking of walls and barriers – not only in Berlin – but throughout the scarred landscape of Europe, will be more relevant of what is to come. The breaking of barriers in the minds of men may be an even more challenging mission.
The world since 1989 has also changed many times. What used to be just three countries in Europe – the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, have been divided into more than 20 states. Geography is not getting any easier, nor is international politics but in a sense we are also reverting to the situation before 1914 when – of course – neither the Soviet Union, nor Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia existed.
The turning point in Eastern Europe and in Russia – die Wende as the Germans have it – did provide an opportunity for re-establishing national self-determination and democracy but it also did uncover old, half forgotten prejudices and national hatreds that the international community still has to come to grips with. In a time of globalised economies and multilateral dependency these conflicts also tend to come closer to home than similar ones ever were before.
While we are addressing – and quite rightly so – the dismantling of weapons of mass destruction – it might be a little impolite to insert that 80% of all casualties in civil strife and war today are inflicted from small arms fire, and of course 90% of all casualties in war are civilians. Modern war knows no fronts. The psychological fronts and even the tactical disposition of troop operations cut straight through society as a whole. Now we are facing the information warfare, using the latest tools of technology as weapons. [3]
New threats have also been added to those known before. In an unprecedented manner the new government defence bill to the Swedish parliament just a couple of weeks ago, clearly states the arrival of new threats. While asserting that there is no longer a valid basis for Sweden’s armed forces in confronting a full-scale invasion of the country within the next foreseeable ten years, other aspects targeting the health and security of the nation demand attention. [4]
The scope of this challenge – summarised as posing an extraordinary threat to peaceful society – encompasses environmental or ecological and natural disasters, mass expulsion of refugees, famine on a global scale, nuclear accidents, organised crime, gun-running and trafficking in narcotics, and vaccine-resistant diseases. All form a part of this widened threat pattern and call for a new concerted approach to – and a new definition of – national security, if this phrase might be in usage for much longer. Most of these so-called new threats are actually well-known throughout history. What is new is the attention they are given in the absence of other threats.
International cooperation has thus been a reinforced path to achieve these common objectives of a new form of security in a new era, not only out of a positive interest but also from pure self-preservation.
For the first time since the second world war, there is also a potential and a willingness to confront new and common threats within the Baltic and the Nordic area as a whole. This means bridging political, psychological, cultural and historical barriers built up and maintained during the sad years of totalitarianism and human division.
The on-going process of European integration for the member states of the European Union goes even further in adopting extra-territorial legislation and policy directives binding for its member states. Inter-dependency is seen as both a long-term objective, a method and a teaching exercise in living and coping with each other.
I will just for some time limit myself – first of all to fit the scope of time, but also to fit my mind, to the relationship between Sweden and Russia – even though the Northern dimension has a wider array of influence. In talking about Sweden I also include Finland with all respect and credit to this brave nation and its independence, but remembering that there has been a dominating Swedish presence in that country for 600 years, while the Southern provinces in Sweden only have been Swedish for 300 years. Swedish is still the second official language of Finland and there is a special relationship between our two countries along the lines of the United States and the United Kingdom. [5]
From the outset it should be noted that Russia has always been a key factor in Swedish foreign and security policy. How could it have been otherwise?
Our early contacts date back to the Viking age. [6] In my country the very first written documents to be found – inscribbled on stones – tell us about this heritage in stories of journeys, raids, trade and adventures in Russia.
During later years Russia, in the company of Denmark, became the traditional arch-enemy – the главный враг – of Sweden. The battle field was always Finland with the exception of the formidable campaign in 1809 when Russian troops marched across the Baltic ice in two frontal attacks and set foot on Sweden.
An officer of the Swedish Navy and historian, have registered 31 major wars fought by Sweden since 1521. Two thirds of these can be derived from two basic medieval conflicts, namely unrelenting Danish contest for the Swedish monarchy and Russian west-wardly expansion, always in contradiction with Swedish ambitions and east-wardly expansion. [7] Finnish troops and regiments were widely used throughout Europe – and certainly against Denmark and against Russia. [8] Hence the Finnish cry that Sweden will fight to the last Finn!
Two cold-blooded assumptions – although not official in any way – have underlined and steered Sweden’s foreign and security policy for almost two centuries – for good and for worse:
1) Sweden’s geographical position is fixed.
2) The world is what it is.
These assumptions produced the imperative:
Stay out of trouble.
For a long time I feel that these insular assumptions (and we can all dress them in for this event more suitable theoretical and conventional linguistics, such as peacetime non-alignment and neutrality in war) had almost been integrated into our traditional mentality. Our perception of external threats and the surrounding world, largely depends on the political ambitions, action patterns and capabilities of the other states but also our own history and our view of ourselves. Today that view of ourselves and the rest of the world seems to be in evolution.
Becoming a member of the European Union in 1995, was perhaps inevitable for a country so dependent on export markets but the notion of Euro-scepticism, distancing itself from the very fabric of deepened integration is very much the order-of-the-day in Sweden. Outside interference is just as touchy in Sweden as in Russia.
The reason why goes back a long time. Maybe we are still coping with the legacy of accumulated fatigue from our days as a European front runner and major power player, a sort of post-traumatic stress disorder to put in modern terms. Losing Finland in the war with Russia in 1808-1809 was nevertheless a turning point.
After the final war – with Denmark and its French coalition – when by the way Russia was our ally – in the formative period of 1812-1814, Sweden practically withdrew from its Baltic sea ambitions and turned inwards, later – after the mass emigration of nearly one and a half million people to the United States – we started building what became the welfare state financed by a remarkable series of innovations and world-wide patents and an ever-increasing output of our industry. A great portion of that manufacturing industry but also its advanced research laboratories were actually situated in this great city and in other parts of Russia.
While the industry and our multinational companies became even more globalised, stretching across the world for markets and production facilities, the Swedish government during the 1960s took a more active stand on international issues, however mostly by remote control dealing with the decolonisation and Asian wars. Sweden has been a strong protagonist of the United Nations and Swedish peace-keeping troops have been actively deployed in first and foremost the Middle East and Korea, later in places such as Bosnia.
It should however be noted that Sweden in a remarkable shift of policy never declared itself neutral during the Finnish-Soviet Winter War of November 1939. Instead 1/3 of Sweden’s military hardware was shipped to Finland and recruitment centres established throughout military installations. Some 10.000 Swedish and Norwegian troops fought for Finland.
During the 1800s a student movement called for Scandinavian unity and reassessment of the common heritage of the Nordic countries. This movement and idea labelled Scandinavianism paved the way for intensified cooperation between the Nordic countries, but only after the second world war. Sweden’s international ambitions were at that time clearly and undividingly focused on the Nordic context.
The Nordic Council, established in 1953, has been a rallying point for a number of Nordic legislative and other initiatives. The five Nordic countries – Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland and Sweden have altogether a population of 23 million and is a common labour market. Since its beginning more than one million citizens have used this opportunity of working and residing in each others countries. Legislation, especially in the field of commercial and private law is to a large extent harmonised between the countries. Nordic citizens have travelled freely between their countries since 1954 due to a passport union. Customs control is also jointly regulated.
Some of the rules had to be changed in order to accommodate the framework of the European Union after 1995 and the practical sides of Nordic unity are somewhat shaken by the division of the membership stock on both sides of the new Union. Today the Nordic Council and the idea of Nordic cooperation has to take into account the facts of life that three of its member states also are a part of a wider Union with legislative and political ambitions, while Norway and Iceland stay outside.
But the Nordic dimension – to be distinguished from the Northern dimension – is evident in the appointment of a special minister for Nordic affairs in all Nordic countries.
It should be noted however, that security and defence matters have been off limits to Nordic cooperation over the years since both Denmark, Iceland and Norway have been members of NATO from the start while Sweden and Finland have taken a non-aligned stand. Finland was also linked to the former Soviet Union through a treaty of friendship and cooperation, which was an instrument of Soviet influence. Like so many other international organisations, not to mention NATO itself, the Nordic Council is redefining its objectives to fit the new landscape of European integration and the new Northern dimension.
For the last ten years Sweden and of course Finland – but also Denmark and to a lesser extent Norway – have been forming a policy for the Baltic area and later for Russia. Another Ministerial post has been assigned for the Baltic area in Sweden.
This process can be seen even at the local level in Sweden where international contacts from the closing of the second world war had been limited to the Nordic countries. City and town twinning programs that had been in effect for decades between those countries, suddenly found a Baltic dimension.
During and after the war tens of thousands of refugees from the Baltic countries found a new home in Sweden. Many have taken up positions in public life. Others are to be found in industry and commerce. Today the Minister of Justice in Sweden is of Latvian descendent while the chief advisor to the Prime Minister and the government cabinet has Estonian origin. It is therefore altogether proper that a good number of government Ministers and public officials in Estonia and the other Baltic countries master Swedish as their second – or even first language!
Sweden and the other Nordic countries were quick to respond to the material needs of the newly independent Baltic nations and this assistance has since then been transformed into a multifold of people-to-people contacts, exchange programs, and in general a revitalisation of old traditions from the times of Swedish territorial presence in the Baltic area not the least in the field of higher education.
The Swedish government presented its over-all Baltic policy to the Parliament two months ago. [9] The Baltic area is a high-priority subject in Sweden’s foreign policy as well as the Nordic dimension – the integration of Nordic government positions and policies. Through the established development cooperation measures some 800 million crowns are funnelled yearly to the countries in Central- and East Europe adding to a few billion crowns earmarked for Baltic Sea projects.
Energy and environmental affairs, information technology, nuclear safety and social development are listed as the most important areas of cooperation and assistance. According to the minister in charge, the Baltic region is perceived as one of the most dynamical regions in [10]
Sweden’s high profile in the Baltic area could be seen as a reclaimer of its previous positions before 1809 when for all practical purposes the Baltic Sea was a Swedish sea. [11] Today only two Baltic sea states have the preserved capacity to launch an amphibious military operation – Russia and Sweden!
During the 1980s the Northern flank of Europe gained increased military importance. The Forward Maritime Strategy, later revised as the Maritime Strategy, was designated in 1986 to intercept a Soviet naval break-out across the GIUK gap (Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom), and protect NATO’s rapid deployment and reinforcement plans for the defence of Norway and Northern Europe. [12] The Norwegian sea was even characterised by the former U.S. naval minister John F. Lehman as ”the main naval battlefield” in a European armed conflict. [13]
The political ”changing of the seasons” during the last ten years have completely altered the military dimension of the Maritime Strategy. Instead the United States has become preoccupied with the peaceful integration of the successor states of the Soviet Union into the world community as a preventive policy.
<>The North-eastern European Initiative should be viewed in this context but also signifies the continued interest that the United States shows in the stability of the region and is an outlet of the over-all NATO strategy on what used to be the Northern flank. The North-eastern European Initiative follows in the footsteps of the Finnish initiative to the European Council in Luxemburg in 1997. Finland’s idea of ”A Northern Dimension for the Policies of the European Union” was well received by the subsequent European Council meeting in Vienna in December last year.
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland views the aims of the ”Northern Dimension” as a way of working with the countries of Europe’s northern regions to increase prosperity, strengthen security and resolutely combat dangers such as environmental pollution, nuclear risks and cross-border crime. [14]
The European Commission’s report to the meeting in Vienna more or less streamlined the principles put forward by the Finnish government. The General Affairs Council in May this year adopted Guidelines for the implementation of the Northern Dimension. The European Council meeting in Cologne in June 1999 was another break-through for the Northern Dimension, aimed at raising the European profile in the region and was inter-acting with the European Union’s Common Strategy on Russia. [15]
When the European Foreign Ministers conference on the Northern Dimension in Helsinki took place this November, three themes were addressed as vital to the Dimension; namely promoting stability through economic integration, trans-border challenges of European significance and perspectives for regional co-operation. [16] The participants included the 15 EU member states, the 7 designated Northern Dimension partner countries – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Russian Federation, Norway and Iceland, the European Commission and observers from international investment banks and regional organisations.
Current discussions are focused on bringing the would-be partners from Russia, the European Union accession countries and Norway and Iceland, into a formal commitment for attaining the goals of the Northern Dimension. The PCA – the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement – with Russia is another framework for the Northern Dimension.
A constructive Russian perspective on the Northern Dimension was introduced by the vice-governor of St. Petersburg. The Dimension’s importance for the development of the North-Western part of Russia is stressed by him. The European Union’s repeated reference to Russia as a resource depot of raw materials is understandably and correctly dismissed. Instead the European investors should provide financial support for processing plants and advance the use of cutting-edge technology. The Russian North-West has the specialists it takes and the city and region of St. Petersburg remains the key to the Russian Northern Dimension, according to this voice. [17]
Territorial division and polycentric decision-making have become evident in our new Europe. Central governments no longer play the dominating role they are used to, not even within the field of what used to be foreign relations. Membership in the European Union, has provided regions with an alibi for promoting their diversity and trans-national cooperation under the permissive umbrella of subsidiarity. The Southern province of Sweden for example has taken full advantage of this opportunity, and a national legislative license, to expand its traditional contacts with Denmark, but also with Baltic neighbours such as Poland and Germany. [18]
To a greater extent the cities and the regions in Europe have set their own pace in conducting exchange programs within the fields of their responsibilities, including social affairs, culture, education, rescue services, environmental protection, information technology, water management and so on. It has to be inserted that this usually entails national government funding. In Sweden local and regional authorities are not allowed to transfer their tax revenues abroad for other purposes than those explicitly permitted by law.
In October this year the Swedish government adopted a ”country strategy” for Russia for the next two years, stressing the need for continuous development cooperation and Russian accession into European structures and institutions.
Bilateral cooperation and contacts through the European Union are seem as the principal features of this development cooperation program that originally started in 1991. The strategy has shifted its focus to supporting a socially sustainable transformation of Russian society. [19]
While the Finns let the Northern Dimension set sail during there chairmanship of the European Union, Sweden has let it be known that relations with Russia will be a matter of priority during its forthcoming chairmanship in the spring of 2001.
Twinning programs between regions and cities are seen as one major part of this program. I am confident that the success of several recent twinning projects, has strengthened this notion. Today more than 30 twinning programs between Swedish and Russian cities are in progress and this share of exchange projects with local authorities in Sweden will increase. There are several noteworthy examples of regional twinning such as the Euroregion Baltic in the Southeastern part of Sweden working with Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Denmark and Russia.
It is also noteworthy that several Swedish military units have established ties with Russian regiments and air squadrons.
No one should be in doubt that it is also a quiet, but determined wish at the Foreign office in Stockholm that at least some of the accession negotiations for the European Union enlargement could be concluded in Sweden during its chairmanship in the spring of 2001.
Threat perception and Internet connection are not contradictory components. They are not even two sides of a coin, but run in random inter-action with each other, provoking each other and interfering with each other.
Internet connection in the sense of a multifold of transnational contacts and meeting-points between students and citizens, an everyday UN, is not in the interest of those who seek to build up ethnical or political threats between peoples and states. Limiting the flow of information, or controlling it would be their primary objective, but even the democratic society has been invoked to take action against abuses of this platform.
Both Sweden and Russia – probably from different constitutional and political reasons – have become the centres of ultra-nationalist, national socialist and white supremacist propaganda, even tactical terrorist planning. [20] This raises serious questions on the limits of the freedom of speech and international checks and balances in the information age. [21]
Information war conducted with the Internet as a channel, does exhibit a striking and even alarming reminder that we can make war with every technological method available, but this observation is not new. All forms of modern communication, be it radio transmissions or computer networks, have a military potential as well as cars and rains. [22] Information technology is now one of the fastest growing industries in the world with implications for governance, diplomacy, journalism, research, education, commerce and every concerned citizen.
Many romantic notions have been displayed by over-enthusiastic users and dealers of equipment and purveyors of telecommunications services of the Internet as a means of addressing the world’s imminent challenges. They may have forgotten that still half of the world’s total population has not used a telephone.
Nevertheless the rapid growth of the Internet does provide us with a magnificent tool for communication and exchange of views. I supplies us with fast links to knowledge or just information, but it also breaks barriers and it does bring people together.
The Internet is also interesting because it is intertwined in most on-going projects within the framework of Baltic cooperation, either as a means of communication with specific web sites being set up and E-mail list servers, sometimes with the aim of publicising events and results and also to as an aid to partner searches. Internet project with web pages can be used as a market place for consultants or a bulletin board for school twinning. [23]
For a number of years Western and Russian analysts and researchers have been watching each other in government institutions and university faculties. In the West there is still a number of centres for what used to be Soviet or Russian, or Communist and East European studies.
The integration of Russia into the sphere of North European cooperation provides the universities and practical researchers with an unprecedented chance to study the future possibilities and the options for all of us, not looking at each other but firmly addressing common challenges and a common environment together.
The Northern Dimension asserts the direction towards cooperation and partnership. The practical contents of the Dimension remains to be seen, although some of the Pre-accession assistance financial and technical transfer programs of the European Union have been set to use in this regard through institution building, investment support and twinning projects.
The inter-relationship between the Baltic sea states and the diverse Northern cousins from Iceland, Norway as well as harbouring American and Canadian interest, together with the European league of nations, seems somewhat loose from the outset. Have the circles of influence for the Northern Dimension been over-extended already?
The Northern Dimension is not a regional initiative side-stepping the European Union. On the contrary it is the adopted policy of the European Union. It is therefore unclear how this program in due course will co-exist with the regional ambitions of the Baltic sea states in promoting what they perceive as their common interests.
The linkage between national policies and the practical realities has not been formulated. How will this be assured?
The Nordic dimension emanating from the Nordic council and the Common strategy of the European Union on Russia adopted by the European Union both have their advantages of being firmly tied to an institutional framework while the Northern Dimension is not - yet. The Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs takes the view that working mechanisms and implementation of the Northern Dimension should utilise both the European Union and regional bodies such as Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the Barents Euro Arctic Council (BEAC) as well as the Arctic Council [24]. Then there is the European Union and the partner countries tied to the EU through PCA or Europe treaties. On top of this we have non-EU countries Norway and Iceland – both Nordic and Northern- and looking over the shoulder NATO , PfP and possibly OSCE.
The organisational weakness of this security political conglomerate does not diminish the importance of the proposal but the forms and ways for institutional responsibility have to be amended.
I also feel that we in the Western countries are all taking about Russia. I am not quite sure we are talking enough with Russia. From now and onwards Russia should play a visible role in forming and adopting a shared vision of the Northern dimension.
We all have to learn how to live and navigate in a new world. This transitional process has its flaws and its setbacks – not to mention its social costs. The strive for a democratic unity, prosperity and a civil society poses an exciting and rewarding challenge. My hope is that what we call the Northern Dimension will be a bridge between once separated peoples – a doorway to a new world of opportunity and free movement of ideas and people, and of services and goods. The universities and their teachers and the students have a constructive role in acquiring and providing knowledge – not just information – to future needs.
I hope that the promises of information technology will serve as a rightful instrument of peace and a bond between friends and that we will see a switch from threat perception to true and real-time connection!
Today we are reflecting on the Northern Dimension as a step towards normality in Europe where Russia has always played an important part. In the final analysis I hope that we will all be a part of what is not merely a Northern Dimension - but hopefully the global, human dimension of tomorrow.
[1] All threats are not acted upon. ”Reading” the opponents intentions have in the course of history invariably fallen prey to prejudice, ignorance, ”self-imaging”, and ”reflexive control”. In-activity in imminent danger would be just as dangerous as acting out of a misconstrued or misperceived threat. It should also be noted that the anatomy of a threat differs from a democracy to a dictatorship in the sense that political opposition or political pluralism is a real threat to the extension of any authoritarian or totalitarian power.
Robert J. Lieber has identified what he terms a ”security dilemma”: ”Because of this insecurity, and the nature of the ”self-help” system in which they exist, they feel compelled to arm themselves. Yet, in doing so, they do not necessarily increase their own security, because their neighbors and rivals also resort to the same means.” (Lieber, Robert J., No common power. Understanding International relations, Georgetown University, 1988, p. 5)
[2] Lukacs, John, The End of the 20th Century and the End of the Modern Age, 1993
[3] Adams, James, The Next World War, London, 1998
[4] Regeringens proposition 1999/2000:30, Det nya försvaret (Government bill 1999/2000:30, The new defence)
[5] It is for example the established practice of an in-coming Swedish Prime Minister to visit Finland on his first official trip to a foreign country.
[6] Kan, Alexander, Sverige och Ryssland: Ett 1200-årigt förhållande, Stockholm, 1996
[7] Sundberg. Ulf, Svenska krig 1521-1814, Lund, 1998, sid. 9. Several of these wars lasted for a prolonged time. The 30th year war went on from 1618-1648 with Swedish troops deployed in Germany from 1630 while the Nordic War was fought from 1700-1721.
[8] Studies on the security relationship between Sweden and Finland in a historical perspective has been the hallmark of Åbo Academy for a number of years. Most recently the Finnish Embassy in Stockholm took the initiative to a compilation of historical essays on this subject published in Stockholm.
The very title of the book ”Det hotade landet & det skyddade”, Södertälje, 1999, gives a clue to the meaning of geography (”The threatened and the protected country”) .
[9] Regeringens skrivelse 1999/2000:7 Ekonomisk utveckling och samarbete i Östersjöregionen.
[10] Sveriges politik för ekonomisk utveckling och samarbete i Östersjöregionen, Utrikesdepartementet, pressmeddelande, 1999-10-06
[11] Perspective and position account for a different outlook. It is interesting to note that the Estonian name for the Baltic sea is Läänemeri - the West sea. In Sweden and Finland the Baltic sea is known as Östersjön – the East Sea. The German name is the Ostsee.
[12] Lundqvist, Jörgen, The strategical situation of the North, Flank or front? Reflections on dynamical deterrence and power projection in the Nordic area, Swedish Air Force Staff, (restricted circ.) 1987.
[13] Alexander, Joseph H., The Role of US Marines in the Defence of North Norway, Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1984, p. 192
[14] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, A Northern Dimension for the Policies of the European Union, HELD1139-24
[15] Stenlund, Peter, Policies for the Northern Dimension, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 18 June 1999,
[16] Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Foreign Ministers' conference on the Northern Dimension, Helsinki 11-12 November, 1999
[17] Tkachev, Gennadij, Saint Petersburg the ”Northern Dimension of the European Union”, BSSSC newsletter, No 3-1999, p. 3
[18] The region is usually defined with regard to the geographical division of government, a subnational but authorised level of decisionmaking – self-government.
[19] Utrikesdepartementet, Ökat stöd till utvecklingssamarbetet med Ryssland, 1999-10-14
[20]
Extremistische Bestrebungen im Internet, Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Köln,
Januar 1999, According to a spokesman for the government agency, some 320
websites for right-wing extremist organisations in Germany are known. In
addition there are some 11.400 foreign websites that can be accessed in more
than 30 countries.
Report from the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 3 December,
1999
[21] The first criminal law trial of an Internet user in Communist China rendered the accused a two year prison sentence for providing foreign campaigners with lists of E-mail addresses (Die Welt, 21 January, 1999).
[22] Already the Hague convention on neutrality of October 18th 1907, stipulates that states at war do not have the right to establish facilities or stations for radio or telegraphic transmission on the soil of a neutral state to serve as a means of communication with their armed forces at sea or on land. (Article 3).
[23] The Baltic Sea Alliance has the main objective of enhancing the information flow in the Baltic sea area through the Internet and to link the web-sites of organisations. Partner-search through the Internet is another service much in demand by both public and privately funded project organisations.
[24] Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, A Northern Dimension for the policies of the European Union, Internal Position paper, HELD 1139-24.
Copyright: Jörgen Lundqvist, 1999
Published
by: European Documentation Centre in St. Petersburg
http://www.edc.spb.ru/publications/lun.htmle